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DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE CONTAINS 
IRRELEVANT AND OTHERWISE INADMISSIBLE MATERIAL 
Citing the affidavit of Kent Fletcher, Respondent's Brief recites certain statements made by 
the decedent Zachary Cowan (Respondent's Brief, p. 1). These statements are inadmissible on a 
number of grounds. Plaintiff Soignier (Sone-yea) had moved to strike the Fletcher affidavit (R., pp. 
200-202). In his summary judgment decision, the district court ruled: 
The Court finds that it is unnecessary to reach a decision on Ms. 
Soignier's Motion to Strike the Fletcher affidavit, for the reason that, 
as set forth below, the court has not based its summary judgment 
decision on any of the contested evidence proffered in the Fletcher 
affidavit. 
R., p. 2 i 0. 
Notwithstanding this ruling, defendant perceives the decedent's statements to be relevant. 
This focus is an impermissible attempt to distract the attention of this Court from the issues at hand. 
First, the district court's decision was based upon the conclusion that defendant Fletcher did not 
breach any "duty" owed plaintiff(R. p. 21 3). The decedent's statements are irrelevant to this issue. 
Secondly, in malpractice actions, an attorney cannot be "subject[ed] . . to lawsuits" 
based upon what a putative beneficiary "understood the testator had stated." Harriafeld v. Hancock, 
i40 Idaho 134, 139, 90 P.3d 884 (2004). Therefore, in the name of consistency and fairness, 
attorneys cannot claim that they did not breach a duty to a named beneficiary by testifying to "what 
they understood the testator had stated or indicated" the bequest a beneficiary would receive. Id., 
140 Idaho at 139. 
Thirdly, to the extent the statements are offered for the truth of the matter asserted, they are 
hearsay and should be stricken. 
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APPLICATION OF HARRIGFELD 
Defendant Fletcher im~roperlv seeks rehge in the claritv of the Will: Pages 5 through 16 
of Fletcher's appellate brief are an extended argument that boils down to the proposition that, 
because Cowan's Will was unambiguous, Fletcher cannot, as a matter of law, have breached any 
duty owed to plaintiff Soignier. While the Will (R. pp. 95-97) may have been clear, it had no 
application to the decedent's testamentary status and asset holdings. 
First, even had the Trust (R. p. 135-1 63) existed at the time ofcowan's death, upon his death 
prior to reaching age fifty the trust transferred his beneficial interest to Sandra Keller or her 
survivors. That is, there was no power of appointment, contrary to the provision in the Will, by 
which the decedent could devise his beneficial interest in the trust. Secondly, and more to the point, 
had defendant checked the Trust to confirm, or not, the power of appointment, he would have 
ascertained that, the decedent having reached age fifty, the trust had terminated and the subject assets 
should be identified as being held by the decedent outright. Failure to adjust the language of the Will 
prevented decedent's intent from being realized. 
Under Harrideld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134, 138, 90 P.3d 884 (2004): "an attorney 
preparing testamentary instruments owes a duty to beneficiaries named or identified therein to 
prepare such instruments . . . so as to effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the 
testamentary instruments".' The decedent Cowan clearly intended to bequeath to Sognier assets 
which had been held in trust. Given Cowan's age (fifty plus), a glance at the trust would have told 
defe~ldant attorney that those assets were held outright by the decedent and the Will had to be 
modified accordingly. 
Plaintiff is not seekina to have Harrigfeld overruled: Defendant Fletcher suggests that 
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Soignier is asking this Court to overrule Harrigfeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 134,90 P.3d 884 (2004). 
See page 8 of Fletcher's brief on appeal. This statement is not accurate; Soignier would not ask this 
Court to overrule the very case that gives her standing to sue Fletcher. Obviously, what Soignier is 
requesting in this case is an explication of Harriafeld rather than its reversal. When the Will is 
placed alongside the Trust, it is plain that the Will fails to carry out the decedent's intent with respect 
to assets previously held in trust and their bequeathment to her as a "named" beneficiary. Id, 140 
Idaho at 1 3 8. 
The future of Harriafeld: In assessing how Harrideld will be applied in future cases of 
alleged malpractice, it may be helpful to examine the variables of (1) clarity in a will (or lack 
thereof) and (2) whether (or not) the named beneficiary has received the intended bequest. In 
examining the four possible combinations ofthese factors, it must be remembered that an ambiguous 
will may be clarified by resort to extrinsic evidence. Hintze v. Black, 125 Idaho 655,658,873 P.2d 
Probate Scenario Ambipuous Will? Testators intent achieved? Malpractice 
# 1 No Yes No 
Yes Yes (by resort to No 
extrinsic evidence) 
Yes No (despite resort to No 
extrinsic evidence) 
#4 (Soignier) No No ? 
In Scenarios #2 and #3, it will never be known with certainty whether the resort to extrinsic 
evidence achieved a result consonant with the testator's intent. But by the litigation process absurd 
results would be ruled out. Also, under these circumstances, a disappointed putative beneficiary 
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could not prosecute the will drafter for negligence on the theory that the result of the probate trial 
was wrong. 
Respecting Scenario #4 (the case at bench), it will be argued by defendant that concluding 
that the testator's intent was not achieved begs the question. However, the only alternative (and 
unreasonable) conclusion is that the testator was playing a cruel trick on plaintiff by making a 
specious bequest. Fletcher's position is that as long as the testamentary document is unambiguous 
on its face it must be presumed that the will accurately captured the testator's intent. This principle 
may govern the decisions of the probate courts in Idaho. Hintze v. Black, 125 Idaho at 658. 
However, in the case at bench, a malpractice action, it would be absurd to conclude that the Will here 
"was properly executed so as to effectuate the testator's intent as expressed in the [Will]". 
Harrigfeld, 140 Idaho at 138. 
TESTATOR ERROR OR ATTORNEY ERROR? 
If Harrigfeld is to have any substance at all, it must be applicable to a case where the 
testamentary document is unambiguous from a legal perspective and yet erroneous as a reflection 
of the testator's actual intent. Soignier acknowledges that an attorney cannot reasonably be expected 
to verify the description of every item mentioned in a will.' Therefore, the attorney's error must be 
such that a lay person cannot reasonably be expected to see the mistake or to correct it when 
reviewing the testamentary document. The examples provided by Soignier on pages 1 1 and 12 of 
her Appellant's Brief reflect the results of her best efforts to find noncontroversial examples that will 
both acknowledge the practical limitations of what can be expected of an attorney and demonstrate 
' Compare page 1 1 of Fletcher's brief on appeal with the example on pages 11  and 12 of 
Soignier's opening brief on appeal. 
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what Soignier believes must be the intended result of Harrideld. 
In the example involving the red and black cars, the attorney has clearly identified a bequest 
in the will at issue. On account of the error in describing the vehicle, the beneficiary takes nothing 
under the terms of the testamentary document. However, the testator can reasonably be expected to 
know whether his car is red or black, and the outcome of the case is most reasonably described as 
the result of a mistake by the testator, for which the attorney cannot reasonably be held responsible. 
In the example involving the statutory description of commercial vehicles (of which the 
testator has none), the attorney has unambiguously, at least from the perspective of ajudge or lawyer, 
identified a bequest in the will, but the mis-description is such that the testator cannot reasonably be 
expected to see the attorney's error in reviewing the document. Once again, the beneficiary takes 
nothing under the terms of the will. But, in this example, the outcome is most reasonably described 
as the result of a mistake by the attorney, and he should be held responsible for the damages suffered 
by the beneficiary. Apart from errors in execution, if there is any other intended application of 
Harrigfeld, Soignier cannot conceive of what that application would be.. 
As applied to this case, the description of Cowan's gift as his "beneficial interest" in a trust 
permits an easy identification of what he intended to give Soignier. In this connection, Fletcher's 
argument that there might be other trusts of which Cowan was the beneficiary (see page 12 of 
Fletcher's brief on appea1)is without any support in the record. The claim that such other trusts 
might exist is, purely and simply, a red herring intended to distract the Court from the actual facts 
involved in this case. 
At the same time, the error about which Soignier complains in this case is not one that the 
court can automatically assume that Cowan, a lay person, should have realized when he received the 
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document before signing it. Such realization would have required him to understand the legal 
technicalities of his interest in the trust as well as the rules by which the testamentary document 
would be construed. 
That the gift intended by Cowan for Soignier is mis-described is proved by the fact that 
Cowan had rlo beneficial interest in any trust at the time that the Will was executed. Had Fletcher 
checked the trust document to confirm that his reference in the Will to a "power of appointment" was 
accurate, he would have known that the trust had terminated on the testator's fiftieth birthday. It 
seems evident that Fletcher, as draftsman ofthe Will, mis-described the bequest intended by Cowan, 
with the result that the mistake frustrated Cowan's actual intent that Soignier be given the property 
that had once been held in trust. 
The same circumstances proving the mis-description of the gift intended by Cowan for 
Soigilier also show how Fletcher's negligence frustrated the intent stated by Cowan in his Will. Any 
questions on that account are resolved, for purposes of the summary judgment proceedings from 
which this appeal arises, by the affidavit of John Magnuson opining that Fletcher breached the 
appropriate standard of care in preparing Cowan's Will. 
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO CITE THE CONTROLLING AUTHORITY ON 
THE ATTORNEY FEE ISSUE BETRAYS THE WEAKNESS OF HIS POSITION 
Controlling authority: In the context of attorney malpractice litigation, the landmark attorney 
fee case is City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656,20 1 P.3d 629 (2009). Contrary to defendant's 
assertion, that decision, not Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594 (2007)' 
expressly overruled Fuller v. Wolters, 1 19 Idaho 4 15,807 P.2d 633 (1 99 1). That nineteen year old 
decision (now overruled) held that in tort actions, including legal malpractice actions, the prevailing 
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party was not entitled to attorney fees. It is remarkable that Respondent Brief fails to cite City of 
McCall. 
City ofMcCall stopped short of holding that the prevailing party in all legal malpractice cases 
is entitled to attorney fees. 
It [I.C. 8 12- 120(3)] mandates the awarding of a reasonable attorney's 
fee to the prevailing party "in any commercial transaction". The latter 
portion of the statute is not limited to contract actions. It "does not 
require that there be a contract between the parties before the statute 
is applied; the statute only requires that there be a commercial 
transaction" [citations omitted]. 
Id., 146 Idaho at 665. 
Also, it may be inferred from the above that the Supreme Court ruled that, just as the contract 
must be "between the parties" in order for I.C. tj 12- 120(3) to kick in, the commercial transaction also 
must be "between the parties" in order for the statute to be operative. 
It is undisputed that there was no commercial transaction between plaintiff Soignier and 
defendant Fletcher. Because plaintiffs standing here is not as decedent Cowan's assignee or 
subrogee, Cowan's relationship with defendant, even if deemed "commercial" in nature, is not 
relevant. 
Because of the unhelpful language in the Citv ofMcCall opinion. Respondent's Brief omits 
reference to that opinion, deferring. instead, to the district court Memorandum Decision in City o f  
McCall (R. p. 225) and Blimka. an earlier decision involving a mercantile transaction. 
Snawing some temerity, the defendant eschews reference to the landmark decision City of 
McCall and, in lieu thereof, chooses to cite the eloquence of Judge McLaughlin in his underlying 
Memorandum Decision in that case: 
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Judge Michael McLaughlin specifically held that a contract for 
attorney services was a commercial transaction, and, "the fact that the 
contract was for attorney services, not any other services, does not 
change the nature of the transaction into one for either personal 
services or household services" (R. p. 229). 
Respondent's Brief, p. 17. 
As noted above, the Supreme Court did not go so far as to categorize all attorneylclient 
dealings as "commercial transactions", i.e., "the statute only requires that there be a commercial 
transaction". Id., 146 Idaho at 665. The underlying transaction in City of McCaIl was undeniably 
a commercial transaction, i.e., a public works contract. The opinion is silent as to whether the 
underlying commercial transaction rendered the attorneylclient relationship "commercial" or whether 
attorneylclient transactions are perceived to be commercial sui  generis.2 
Conclusion: In the case at bench, the imposition of attorney fees is against the law for two 
separate and independent reasons: (1) there was no commercial transaction between plaintiff 
Soignier and defendant Fletcher; and (2) in any event, the matter being dealt with was "personal", 
i.e., an estate planning matter and expressly excluded from the ambit of Idaho Code 5 12-1 20(3). 
CONCLUSION 
For the above cited reasons, the court should reject Fletcher's arguments defending 
summary judgment, reverse that summary judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings. 
In any event, the award of attorney fees should be vacated. 
2 If an attorneylclient relationship is per se "commercial", it follows that all professional 
relationships, including physicianlpatient, are commercial in  nature, i.e., an exchange of professional 
services for money. On the other hand, given the confidential nature of attorneylclient communications, 
it may be plausibly argued that "purpose" of the transaction is "personal" and thus expressly excluded 
from the scope of Idaho Code $12- 120(3). 
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Dated this 21" day of June, 2010. 
n 
,'- 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 22nd day of June, 20 10, I caused to be served two true and 
ccjrrect copies of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Michelle R. Points 
Craig L. h4eadows 
Nawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 161 7 
Boise, Idaho 83701- 16 17 
U.S. Mail 
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